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ADMIRALTY-SEAMEN-WRONGFUL DEATH-FAMILY
DEPENDENTS MAY NOT RECOVER FOR BOTH
NEGLIGENCE UNDER JONES ACT AND
UNSEAWORTHINESS UNDER
STATE STATUTE
Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148 (1964)
Daniel Gillespie, crewman on respondent's ship berthed in the navigable
waters of Ohio,' slipped on a wet ore-loading dock while attempting to board
the vessel, fell and was drowned. His dependent mother, as administratrix
of his estate, sought to recover for herself and for decedent's dependent brother
and sisters upon allegations of negligence under the Jones Act 2 and unseaworthiness under Ohio's wrongful death statute.3 The federal district court
entered an order striking all reference to unseaworthiness and the Ohio statute, and the court of appeals upheld the order. 4 The Supreme Court affirmed
in Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp.,5 holding, inter alia, that the Jones
Act provides an exclusive remedy for the wrongful death of a seaman and
that an allegation of unseaworthiness was therefore improper.
Reviewing its decision in Lindgren v. United States,6 the Court reiterated
its conclusion that
The Merchant Marine [Jones] Act is one of general application
intended to bring about the uniformity in the exercise of admiralty
jurisdiction required by the Constitution, and necessarily 7 supersedes
the application of the death statutes of the several states.
1. Navigability of Great Lakes waters for purposes of admiralty jurisdiction was
established in The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1851).
2. 41 Stat. 1007, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1958) provides:
Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employment
may, at his election, maintain an action for damages at law . . . and in such
action all statutes of the United States modifying or extending the commonlaw right or remedy in cases of personal injury to railway employees shall apply;
and in case of death of any seaman as a result of any such personal injury the
personal representative of such seaman may maintain an action for damages
at law . . . and in such action all statutes of the United States conferring or
regulating the right of action for death in the case of railway employees shall
be applicable.
3.

OHIO REv. CODE § 2125.01 (1964).

4.
5.
6.
7.

Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 321 F.2d 518 (6th Cir. 1963).
379 U.S. 148 (1964).
281 U.S. 38 (1930).
Id. at 44.
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The Court noted that the act gave recovery only for negligence and precluded
any possible recovery on the theory of unseaworthiness. 8 Furthermore, it
added that its interpretation of the act had been undisturbed by Congress in
the thirty-four years since Lindgren.9 Since no allegation of unseaworthiness
was made in Lindgren, its opinion on the applicability of that theory to
wrongful death actions has been challenged as purely dictum' 0 and it is
on that point that the Gillespie decision is significant.
The distinction between unseaworthiness and negligence is well settled.
A federal district court said in Reed v. The Yaka:11 "'[Unseaworthiness'
is not based upon negligence or any wrongful act, rather it is a form of absolute liability which is imposed regardless of fault.' 2 Earliest recognition
of unseaworthiness was as a defense for seamen against forfeiture of wages
for desertion or other misconduct. 1" The fact that a vessel was improperly
built, maintained, equipped or managed to withstand the extraordinary perils
of the sea was considered justification for refusing to serve aboard. This
defense evolved into a positive duty upon shipowners to provide safe working
conditions for their employees afloat. In The Osceola'4 the proposition was
advanced
that the vessel and her owner are, both by English and American
law, liable to an indemnity for injuries received by seaman in consequence of the unseaworthiness of the ship, or a failure to supply and
keep in order the proper appliances appurtenant to the ship. 15
Decisions which followed Osceola interpreted this proposition as eliminating
all considerations of fault or foreseeability, 16 holding shipowners absolutely
liable for nearly every conceivable type of injury connected with shipboard
employment irrespective of any relation to actual perils of the sea. In effect,
the law took the "sea" out of "seaworthy" in allowing recovery for such untoward mishaps as a seaman dropping an "unseaworthy" wrench on his own
foot.'

7

This protection, coupled with wage liens extending to the "last plank"

8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. See Mr. Justice Goldberg's dissent in the instant case. 379 U.S. at 158.
11. 183 F. Supp. 69 (E.D. Pa. 1960) (longshoreman permitted to recover for
"unseaworthiness").
12. Id. at 76.
13. For a full discussion of the history and development of the doctrine of unseaworthiness see both majority and dissenting opinions in Mitchell v. Trawler Racer,
Inc., 362 U.S. 539 (1960).
14. 189 U.S. 158 (1903) (recovery for injuries sustained in following orders of
ship's master).
15. Id. at 175.
16. See, e.g., Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946) ; Mahnich v.
Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1944) ; The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588 (1959).
See also Note, 68 DICK. L. REv. 207 (1964).
17. See Time, April 2, 1965, p. 63.
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of a vessel,' 8 and recovery of maintenance and cure for sickness and injury
arising from the most earthy pursuits ashore' 9 provided the seaman with
benefits that might well have been envied by his laboring counterparts on land.
However, the liberal benefits available under general maritime law
were personal to the seaman. Under the law of the sea, as under the common law, recovery for wrongful death was unknown. 20 Dependents of seafaring breadwinners went uncompensated for their losses until they could
qualify under emerging state statutes which could be enforced in federal
courts. 2 1 But resort to state wrongful death acts was not altogether satisfactory. Many state legislatures were slow to adopt wrongful death statutes;
provisions for recovery were not uniform from state to state; and, application
of state acts depended upon determination of liability by the federal maritime
standard, unseaworthiness, which was not necessarily related to any element
of wrongful conduct.
Then in 1920 Congress passed the Jones Act, incorporating provisions
of the Federal Employer's Liability Act 22 by reference and extending to seamen and their families rights similar to those enjoyed by railroad workers to
recovery for negligent injury and wrongful death. In Interocean S.S. Co. v.
Topolofsky, 23 provisions of the act were said to make the obligation of a shipowner "substantially greater than that of an ordinary employer to his employees."' 24 Decisions under the act note that it abolished the fellow servant
doctrine and made a common employer liable for the negligent conduct of
one employee toward another, 25 eliminated or at least substantially weakened
the defense of assumption of risk,26 and rejected the defense of contributory
27
negligence in favor of the more liberal comparative negligence concept.
Furthermore, the range of "negligence" under the Jones Act is wide enough
28
to cover all types of unseaworthiness except those involving no actual fault.
Despite its general liberality, the Jones Act incorporated one FELA
18. Sheppard v. Taylor, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 675 (1831).
19. See Koistenen v. American Export Lines, 83 N.Y.S.2d 297 (1948)

(seaman

recovers for injuries sustained in falling out window of "house of ill fame" in foreign

port).
20. Kernan v. American Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426 (1958).
21. See GILMORE AND BLACK, ADMIRALTY § 1-17 (1957).
22. 35 Stat. 65, as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1958).
23. 165 F.2d 783 (6th Cir. 1948).
24. Id. at 784.
25. See Becker v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 179 F.2d 713 (2d Cir. 1950); Petition
of Crosby Fisheries, Inc., 31 F.2d 1004 (D.C. Wash. 1929).
26. See De Zon v. American President Lines, 129 F.2d 404 (9th Cir. 1942). See
also Grimberg v. Admiral Oriental S.S. Line, 300 Fed. 619 (D.C. Wash. 1924) (assumption of risk does not apply where negligence of officer or fellow crewman is
involved).
27. Dayton v. Midland S.S. Lines, 110 F. Supp. 418 (D.C.N.Y. 1953).
28. See GILMORE AND BLACK, ADMIRALTY § 6-37 (1957).
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provision which has precipitated continued attempts to invoke state statutes:
Recovery for wrongful death is limited to certain enumerated classes of
dependents in the alternative.2 9 In the Gillespie case decedent's dependent
brother and sisters were precluded from recovery so long as the mother lived,
under the settled interpretation of this provision," ° whereas under the Ohio
death statute they would have qualified jointly. Coupled with the relative
ease of establishing liability by proof of unseaworthiness rather than actual
negligence, the federal statutory restriction makes recovery under the state
acts a tempting goal. But in Lindgren, the Court said of the Jones Act that
"as it covers the entire field for liability for injuries to seamen, it is paramount and exclusive, and supersedes all state statutes dealing with that
subject." 3' It is significant to note that the same result has been reached
2
with respect to railroad workers' claims under the FELA.3
The Gillespie decision highlights several inconsistencies in the area of
recovery for maritime injury and death. The Jones Act did not abolish
unseaworthiness as a test for liability in personal injury actions; in fact, the
doctrine has since been broadened.8 3 Furthermore, where a seaman is killed
or injured on the high seas he or his family is afforded a remedy under both
state and federal law by express provision of the Death on the High Seas
Act.3 4 He may recover on the theory of unseaworthiness for injury in territorial waters, but not for death, causing Judge Learned Hand to ask in
Gill v. United States:35
If the Jones Act 'covers the entire field of liability for injuries to
seamen' . . . and 'is paramount and exclusive,' why does it not

supersede injuries arising from unseaworthiness which do not result
in death, as well as those which do ?36
29. 35 Stat. 65, as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1958) provides that recovery shall be
for the benefit of the surviving widow or husband and children of such employee;
and, if none, of such employee's parents; and, if none, then of the next of kin
dependent upon such employee ....

30. See, e.g., Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. Co. v. Wells-Dickey Trust Co., 275 U.S. 161
(1927); Wade v. Rogala, 270 F.2d 280 (3 Cir. 1959); Smelser v. Southern Ry. Co.,
148 F. Supp. 891 (D.C. Tenn. 1956).
31. 281 U.S. at 47.
32. See Phillips v. Houston Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 219 F. Supp. 420 (D.C. La. 1963);
Bowen v. New York Central R.R. Co., 179 F. Supp. 225 (D.C. Mass. 1959); Florida
East Coast Ry. Co. v. Pollack, 154 So. 2d 346 (Fla. App. 1963).
33. See Note 16, supra.
34. 41 Stat. 537, 46 U.S.C. § 767 (1958) provides:
[T]he provisions of any State statute giving or regulating rights of action
or remedies for death shall not be affected by this chapter.
But see Echavarria v. Atlantic & Caribbean Steam Nay. Co., 10 F. Supp. 677
(E.D.N.Y. 1935) (applicability of state statute denied).
35. 184 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1950) (dissent).
36. Id. at 57.
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It would appear that only the family of a seaman killed in territorialwaters
is limited to recovery under federal statute and required to prove negligence.
An explanation for this seemingly anomalous situation might be found in
the changing and variable nature of a seaman's employment. If, as has been
so often suggested, the concept of absolute liability for "unseaworthiness"
arose as a result of the rigorous discipline and extraordinary perils of seagoing labor, where these conditions do not exist it would seem reasonable to
hold shipowners liable only for actual fault. Reforms won by maritime unions,
the greater speed and structural integrity of ships, and electronic navigation
have combined to make the seaman's life substantially less severe in recent
years. And certainly voyages confined to territorial waters are less hazardous
than those on the high seas. Finally, working about a vessel made fast to a
dock seems hardly more perilous than countless landbound occupations which
are unprotected by strict liability.
Mr. Justice Goldberg, in a vigorous Gillespie dissent 3 7 criticizes the
logic of imputing to Congress an intent to eliminate an existing remedy by
enactment of a remedial statute. However, the extension of the unseaworthiness doctrine beyond direct relationship to the sea and the award of
substantial death benefits with no showing of fault may have been part of what
the Jones Act sought to remedy. In any event, it may be that the beneficiary
classification of the FELA and the Jones Act is unduly restrictive and a bar
to just recovery by legitimately dependent relatives where fault is established
in the death of a seaman. If so, a simple legislative amendment would seem
a proper and adequate solution.
J.
37. 379 U.S. at 158.

M. BODDINGTON

LABOR RELATIONS-PENNSYLVANIA COURTS ARE NOT
PRE-EMPTED BY THE NLRB IN A SUIT
INVOLVING LIBEL-CONFUSION
Meyer v. Joint Council 53, Teamsters Union,
416 Pa. 401, 206 A.2d 382 (1965)
In the recent case of Meyer v. Joint Council 53, Teamsters Union,' the
plaintiffs were six persons campaigning on behalf of a group known as the
"Voice of Teamsters." "Voice" had attempted to oust the defendant union as
representative for a collective bargaining unit. During the campaign and before
the representation election the defendants printed and distributed a tabloid called
"Teamsters Extra" which imputed various crimes to the plaintiffs.2 After
the election, which was won by the incumbent union, the plaintiffs filed objections with the National Labor Relations Board. One objection alleged that
the tabloid contained libelous statements which influenced the outcome of the
election. The Board overruled this objection. The plaintiffs then instituted
an action in trespass against the unions, seeking damages for libel. The defendants' preliminary objections challenging state court jurisdiction were dismissed by the lower court.3 On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in
a 5-2 decision, affirmed. 4 The court held that the National Labor Relations
Act 5 has not preempted state court jurisdiction in a dispute involving libel.
Although the NLRA represents a comprehensive system of labor regulations which should not be added to nor subtracted from by state law,6 preemption continues to be an area of widespread discussion. 7 Under sections
1. 416 Pa. 401, 206 A.2d 382 (1965).
2. The Meyer court gave the complete listing:
[T]he tabloid enumerated assault and battery, disorderly conduct, public indecency, burglary, larceny of an auto, non-support of family, illegal lottery,
hold-up at point of gun, receiving stolen goods, larceny by pickpocket, robbery,
unlawful possession of drugs, assault and battery with intent to ravish and rape,
rape, sodomy, obscene literature, manslaughter, attempted extortion, booking
gambling bets, impersonating police officer, habitual drunk, larceny, corrupting
morals of a minor.
Id. at 404 n.3, 206 A.2d at 384 n.3.
3. Id. at 404, 206 A.2d at 384.
4. Id. at 416, 206 A.2d at 390.
5. 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-67 (1958),
as amended, 73 Stat. 519 (1959), 29 U.S.C. §§ 153, 158-60, 186, 401-531 (Supp. IV 1963).
6. See Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
7. For a more thorough review of this area see the following articles: Koretz,
Labor Law Decisions of the Supreme Court: 1963 Term, 16 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1 (1963) ;
Michelman, State Power to Govern Concerted Employee Activities, 74 HARV. L. REV.
641 (1961) ; Isaacson, Federal Preemption Under the Taft-Hartley Act, 11 IND. & LAB.
RE. REV. 391 (1958) ; Cox, Federalism in the Law of Labor Relations, 67 HARV. L.
REV. 1297 (1954) ; Hays, Federalism and Labor Relations in the United States, 102 U.
PA. L. REV. 959 (1954) ; Hall, The Taft-Hartley Act v. State Regulation, 1 J. PUB. L.
97 (1952).
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78 and 89 of the act, previously divergent common law court decisions led to
a variety of solutions to labor controversies.' 0 In order to clarify its position
with respect to state court jurisdiction over labor problems, the Supreme Court
said, in the landmark case of San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon:11
When it is clear or may fairly be assumed that the activities which
a State purports to regulate are protected by § 7 of the National
Labor Relations Act, or constitute an unfair labor practice under
the federal enactment requires that state jurisdic§ 8, due regard for
12
tion must yield.

When an activity is arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the Act,
the states as well as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive
competency of the National Labor Relations Board.' 8
Thus the general rule, with certain ill-defined exceptions to be discussed,
is now well settled. If any labor activity is in violation of a state law, but
is also an unfair labor practice over which the NLRB may arguably have
jurisdiction, the state court is ousted and the jurisdiction of the NLRB is
exclusive.'

4

Prior to the Garmon decision, the Supreme Court had specifically allowed
state courts to entertain jurisdiction over certain labor activity even though
it might be within the province of the NLRB.' 5 Rather than overrule these
decisions the Court distinguished them as mere exceptions to the general rule
of preemption. As to the first exception, the Court decided "not to find withdrawal from the states of power to regulate where the activity regulated was a
8. 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C.A. § 157 (1958).
9. 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C.A. § 158 (1958).
10. See, e.g., Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538 (1945) ; Allen-Bradley, Local 1111 v.
Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 315 U.S. 740 (1942).

11. 259 U.S. 236 (1959).
12. Id. at 244.
13. Id. at 245. (Emphasis added).
14. See generally Liner v. Jafco, Inc., 375 U.S. 301 (1964); Local 100, United
Ass'n of Journeymen and Apprentices v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690 (1963) ; Local 207, Int'l
Ass'n of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers v. Perko, 373 U.S. 701
(1963); Local 438, Constr. and Gen. Laborers' Union v. Curry, 371 U.S. 542 (1963);
Marine Eng'rs Beneficial Ass'n v. Interlake S.S. Co., 370 U.S. 173 (1962). See also
the following Pennsylvania cases: Smith v. Pittsburgh Gage & Supply Co., 412 Pa.
171, 194 A.2d 181 (1963) ; Mamula v. United Steelworkers of America, 409 Pa. 175,
185 A.2d 595 (1962) ; Smith's Transfer Corp. v. Voice of Teamsters, 409 Pa. 217, 185
A.2d 563 (1962) ; Terrizzi Beverage Co. v. Local 830, Brewery and Beer Distrib. Drivers,
408 Pa. 380, 184 A.2d 243 (1962) ; Baker v. Local 755, Int'l Ass'n of Bridge, Structural
and Ornamental Iron Workers, 403 Pa. 31, 168 A.2d 340 (1961) ; Navios Corp. v.
National Maritime Union, 402 Pa. 325, 166 A.2d 625 (1960) ; Wax v. International
Mailers Union, 400 Pa. 173, 161 A.2d 603 (1960).
15. See UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958) ; International Ass'n of Machinists
v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958) ; Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 131 (1957);
UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 351 U.S. 266 (1956); United Constr.
Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954).
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merely peripheral concern of the National Labor Relations Act,"' 6 i.e., where
17
the suit involves purely internal union matters.
Secondly, the Court indicated that the states would not be preempted
"where the regulated conduct touched interests so deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility that, in the absence of a compelling congressional direction, we cannot infer that Congress had deprived the States of the power to
act."' 8 It would seem from this that if it could be determined that the activity
in question was a source of deeply rooted local feeling, whatever that is,
the state court would be free to act. Common law libel could very well fit
this description. However, the Court further pointed out that it had "allowed
the states to grant compensation for the consequences, as defined by the traditional law of torts, of conduct marked by violence and imminent threats
to the public order."' 9 The Court had "also allowed the states to enjoin such
conduct. '20 This seems to have restricted the jurisdiction of state courts to
include only cases where violence is either present or menacingly near. It is
certainly more difficult to argue that libel fits this description.
In a recent case,2 1 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court added a third ex16. 259 U.S. at 243.
17. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958)

(State

Court not preempted where employee seeks reinstatement after having been expelled from
union). But see Local 100, United Ass'n of Journeymen and Apprentices v. Borden, 373
U.S. 690 (1963) ; Local 207, Int'l Ass'n of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron
Workers v. Perko, 373 U.S. 701 (1963). See also Local 2, Int'l Organization Masters,
Mates and Pilots of America v. International Organization Masters, Mates and Pilots
of America, Inc., 414 Pa. 277, 199 A.2d 432 (1964).

18. 259 U.S. at 244.
19. Id. at 247. (Emphasis added). See UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958)
(Employee forcibly prevented from entering the plant during a strike) ; United Constr.
Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954) (Union threatened to forcibly
take over the job unless company's employees joined the union).
20. Id. at 247. See Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 131 (1957) (Picketing,
massed name calling, threats and intimidation were calculated to provoke violence);
UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 351 U.S. 266 (1956) (Mass picketing,
coercion and threats lead to violence). See also the following Pennsylvania cases where
injunctions were granted: City Line Open Hearth, Inc. v. Hotel, Motel & Club Em(Violence, mass picketing, threats
ployees' Union, 413 Pa. 420, 197 A.2d 614 (1964)
and coercion); Great Leopard Market Corp. v. Local 196, Amalgamated Meat Cutters,
413 Pa. 143, 196 A.2d 657 (1964) (Picketing, threats, blocking traffic, assaulting an
employee); Smith's Transfer Corp. v. Voice of Teamsters, 409 Pa. 217, 185 A.2d 563
(1962) (Picketing, violence causing work stoppage) ; Fountain Hill Underwear Mills v.
Amalgamated Clothing Workers, 393 Pa. 385, 143 A.2d 354 (1958) (Mass picketing,
violence, preventing entrance to plant by employees). But see Terrizzi Beverage Co. v.
Local 830, Brewery and Beer Distrib. Drivers, 408 Pa. 380, 184 A.2d 243 (1962)
(State court preempted where evidence at trial insufficient to sustain findings that union
slashed tires and poured steel filings into motor of vehicle).
21. Smith v. Pittsburgh Gage & Supply Co., 412 Pa. 171, 194 A.2d 181 (1963).
See also Local 150, Teamsters Union v. Superior Court of Sacramento, 39 Cal. Rptr.
590 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964), which lists three additional areas where state jurisdiction is
not preempted, i.e., where the NLRB declines to take jurisdiction; where a state pro-
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ception which has achieved widespread recognition by the courts since
Garmon. The effect of this exception is that state courts are not preempted
in actions brought to enforce provisions in collective bargaining contracts
22
even though unfair labor practices are involved.
Although the general rule is well settled-that state courts are preempted when a labor activity is "arguably subject" to the NLRA-it is the
exceptions to this rule which have caused judicial uncertainty. A typical
example of this is where, during a labor dispute, 23 uncomplimentary epithets
are used to describe the opposing party. It may be conceded that such activity
is "arguably subject" to sections 724 or 8.25 If the defamed party seeks redress
in a state libel action, the court has jurisdiction only if the activity comes
within one of the exceptions to the general rule. The second exception is the
most obvious, allowing state court jurisdiction if the conduct is a threat to
the public order. When confronted with the fact situation presented by Meyer,
26
the courts have reached diametrically opposite results.

hibition against an agency shop agreement is enforced; where an employee is reinstated
because of a discharge in violation of a state union security statute.
22. See Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261 (1964) (Arbitration provision enforced where collective bargaining agreement so provides) ; Smith v. Evening News
Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962) (Provision prohibiting discrimination against union member
enforced) ; Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U.S. 238 (1962) (Question of arbitration on the basis of the contract is for the courts) ; Dowd Box Co. vv Courtney, 368
U.S. 502 (1962) (Suit for violation of a contract between employer and union is within
state court jurisdiction). See also United Steelworkers of America v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 413 Pa. 358, 196 A.2d 857 (1964).
23. Section 13(c) of the Norris-LaGuardia Act defines this term:
The term "labor dispute" includes any controversy concerning terms or
conditions of employment, or concerning the association or representation of
persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms
or conditions of employment, regardless of whether or not the disputants stand
in the proximate relation of employer and employee. 47 Stat. 73 (1932), 29
U.S.C. § 113 (1958).
24. 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1958). This section provides
in part:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection . ...
25. 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1958). This section enumerates certain unfair labor practices for employers and labor organizations. In addition,
it contains subsection 8(c), the "free speech" provision which states:
The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination
thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not constitute
or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any provisions of this subchapter, if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise
of benefit.
26. Cases stating that state courts are preempted in a libel action: Linn v. Local
114, United Plant Guard Workers of America, 337 F.2d 68 (6th Cir. 1964) ; Local 150,
Teamsters Union v. Superior Court of Sacramento, 39 Cal. Rptr. 590 (Dist. Ct. App.
1964); Blum v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 42 N.J. 389, 201 A.2d 46 (1964);
Schnell Tool & Die Corp. v. United Steelworkers of America, 94 Ohio L. Abs. 231,
200 N.E.2d 727 (Columbiana County Ct. 1964).
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The New Jersey case of Blum v. International Ass'n of Machinists27
represents the prevailing view 28 that a state court is preempted in a libel
action incident to a labor dispute. The plaintiff was a plant manager who
actively resisted 29 a union's attempt to organize. During the course of the
campaign for election the union published a leaflet called "Union News"
which contained allegedly libelous statements.3 0 The plaintiff commenced
a libel action and the defendant union objected to the jurisdiction of the
state court on the ground of preemption. The Supreme Court of New Jersey
reviewed the exceptions to the general rule of Garmon and, in a 4-3 decision, held:
Clearly, the case at hand does not come within any of the stated
exceptions to Garmon. There is no suggestion of violence or threat
of violence as in Laburnum . . .and the activity is not of peripheral
concern as in Gonzales . . . . On the contrary, the activity here, in

the language of Garmon, was within one of the "areas of conduct
which must be free from state regulation if national policy is to be
left unhampered." 3'
In the Meyer case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court aligned itself with
the view that a state court is not preempted in a libel action.3 2 The court
Cases stating that state courts are not preempted in a libel action: R. H. Bouligny,
Inc. v. United Steelworkers of America, 336 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1964) ; Salzhandler v.
Caputo, 316 F.2d 445 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 946 (1963) ; California Dump
Truck Owners Ass'n v. Local 42, Teamsters Union, 45 CCH Lab. Cas.
50546 (Cal.
Super. Ct. 1962); Wilson-Jacobi, Inc. v. Genuth, 35 Misc. 2d 596, 230 N.Y.S.2d 797
(Sup. Ct. 1962); Meyer v. Joint Council 53, Teamsters Union, 416 Pa. 401, 206 A.2d
382 (1965); Southwestern Drug Corp. v. Local 277, Office Employees Int'l Union, 380
S.W.2d 927 (Tex. Ct. App. Dec. Civ. 1964).
27. 42 N.J. 389, 201 A.2d 46 (1964).
28. The Blum decision must be considered the leading case in this category. The
other cases have either relied on or cited Blum with approval.
29. The union filed an unfair labor practices complaint against the plant manager.
The trial examiner found that the manager had violated sections 8(a) (1) and 8(a) (3)
of the NLRA by interrogating, threatening with reprisals, and discriminatorily discharging certain employees. The NLRB agreed with the examiner's findings. Ox-Wall
Prods. Mfg. Co., 135 N.L.R.B. 840 (1962).
30. The leaflet accused the plaintiff of concentration camp pressures, gestapo tactics,
big lie tactics of Hitler, fear and threats. In addition, the plaintiff was accused of discriminating, intimidating, bribing and coercing employees to prevent a free choice in the
election. 42 N.J. at 391, 201 A.2d at 47, 48.
31. 42 N.J. at 396, 201 A.2d at 51.
32. The Meyer case is the first decision discussing at length the question of state
preemption in libel actions to come to this conclusion. See also R. H. Bouligny, Inc. v.
United Steelworkers of America, 336 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1964) (Diversity was the principle question but court said in passing that state courts and not NLRB should be the
forum for libel action) ; Salzhandler v. Caputo, 316 F.2d 445 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 946 (1963) (Preemption was not in issue but court said, in dictum, that libel
may be the basis of a civil suit) ; California Dump Truck Owners Ass'n v. Local 42,
Teamsters Union, 45 CCH Lab. Cas. g 50546 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1962) (State Court is
not preempted in a libel action where the activity is not incident to a labor dispute);
Wilson-Jacobi, Inc. v. Genuth, 35 Misc. 2d 596, 230 N.Y.S.2d 797 (Sup. Ct. 1962) (In-
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assumed that the activities of the defendants were "arguably subject" to the
NLRA. 8 The principle question to which the court addressed itself was
"whether there is a compelling state interest, especially in the maintenance
of domestic peace, upon which state jurisdiction over a libel suit can be
predicated. '' 3 4 The court approved the reasoning of the dissent in the Blum
case that libel has a high potential for violence and consequent breach of
the peace.35 In addition, the court pointed out that the states are concerned
with injury to reputation and discouragement of violence whereas the NLRB
is interested in insuring that an employee's right to choose representation
is free from coercion, falsehood or emotion.A6 Therefore, reasoned the court,
in the absence of a clear expression of congressional intent, state court juris87
diction should not be considered withdrawn.
It is difficult to reconcile the decisions in Meyer and Blum. The contrary
results are probably due to each court's interpretation of the enumerated
exceptions to the general rule set out in Garmon. New Jersey would limit
these exceptions to activity involving immediate violence, mass picketing,
threats, intimidation and coercion. Reliance would be placed on the statement
in Garmon; "conduct marked by violence and immediate threats to the public
order."' 8 Pennsylvania, on the other hand, has already refused to give this
exception such a narrow interpretation.8 9 Where hand bills, circulars and
leaflets contain defamatory matter, Pennsylvania would allow state court
jurisdiction. The reason is not so much due to the violence involved but because, in the language of Garmon, this is "conduct . . .so deeply rooted in

junction against distributing handbills-brief discussion of the problem) ; Southwestern
Drug Corp. v. Local 277, Office Employees Int'l Union, 380 S.W.2d 927 (Tex. Ct. App.
Dec. Civ. 1964) (Damages for slander during organizations campaign-same).
33. 416 Pa. at 406, 201 A.2d at 384.
34. Id. at 407, 201 A.2d at 385. In City Line Open Hearth, Inc. v. Hotel, Motel &
Club Employees' Union, 413 Pa. 420, 197 A.2d 614 (1964) the court said:
Petitioners urge that all of this abusive language was protected and that they
could not, therefore, be enjoined from using it. We cannot agree. Words can
readily be so coupled with conduct as to provoke violence. [I]f a sufficient number
yell any word sufficiently loudly showing an intent to ridicule, insult or annoy,
no matter how innocuous the dictionary definition of that word, the effect may
cease to be persuasion and become intimidation and incitement to violence .
Id. at 433, 197 A.2d at 622.
35. Id. at 409, n.ll, 201 A.2d 386 n.11.
36. Id. at 411, 201 A.2d at 387.
37. Id. at 412, 201 A.2d at 388.

38. 259 U.S. at 247.
39. In the Meyer case, the court commented:
The theory on which this holding [of preemption] was predicated was that under
Garmon only violence or the threat of violence would permit the exercise of
such jurisdiction. We cannot agree that the language used in Garmon justifies
such a narrow interpretation of the area of jurisdiction left to the state and
federal courts. 416 Pa. at 407 n.10, 201 A.2d at 385 n.10.
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local feeling and responsibility that, in the absence of a compelling congressional direction . . .-4o state courts will not be preempted.
A recent California case 4 1 dealt with the question of state jurisdiction
over a libel action incident to a labor dispute. After reviewing the general
rule and exceptions thereto, the court stated: "However, no Supreme Court
case has held that a state may enjoin a libel where the activity was arguably
within the protection or prohibition of the National Labor Relations Act." 42
Accordingly, the court decided that libel would be governed by the general
rule rather than any of the exceptions and state jurisdiction was preempted.
Until the Supreme Court introduces harmony into this area, preemption is
probably the safer course to follow. In view of its recent decisions 43 it seems
more likely that the Supreme Court will narrowly construe the exceptions to
the general rule of Garmon and hold that state courts are preempted from
entertaining suits in libel where the activity is "arguably subject" to the
NLRA.
ROBERT A. MILLS
40. 259 U.S. at 244.
41. Local 150, Teamsters Union v. Superior Court at Sacramento, 39 Cal. Sup.
Rptr. 590 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
42. Id. at 593.
43. See Local 100, United Ass'n of Journeymen and Apprentices v. Borden, 373
U.S. 690 (1963), and Local 207, Int'l Ass'n of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron
Workers v. Perko, 373 U.S. 701 (1963), where the Supreme Court issued a restrictive
interpretation on the first exception to the general rule. See also Koretz, Labor Law
Decisions of the Supreme Court: 1963 Term, 16 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1 (1963).

FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE-RULE 35PHYSICAL AND MENTAL EXAMINATION OF
DEFENDANTS-REQUIREMENT OF "GOOD
CAUSE" AND "IN CONTROVERSY"MANDAMUS AS REMEDY
Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104 (1964)
The Supreme Court recently examined for the first time the construction
and validity of Rule 35, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,' providing for the
physical examination of parties, as it applies to a defendant in a negligence
suit. In Schlagenhauf v. Holder,2 the Court, through Mr. Justice Goldberg,
held that Rule 35 may apply to defendants as well as to plaintiffs in appropriate cases.
This litigation arose when certain bus passengers brought an action in
the district court for injuries sustained in a collision between the bus in which
they were riding and a tractor trailer. Named as defendants were Robert
Schlagenhauf, the bus driver, the Greyhound Corporation, owner of the bus,
Contract Carriers, Inc., owner of the tractor, National Lead Company, owner
of the trailer, and Joseph McCorkhill, driver of the tractor3 (hereinafter
Greyhound, Contract and National). Each of these defendants denied negligence. Greyhound thereafter cross-claimed against Contract and National for
damage to its bus. Contract denied any negligence and asserted in its answer
that the negligence of Schlagenhauf was the proximate cause of the collision.
Contract further alleged that Schlagenhauf was not mentally or physically
capable of driving a bus at the time of the accident. Contract and National
then petitioned the court for an order pursuant to Rule 35 directing Schlagenhauf to submit to examinations by four specialists in the fields of internal
medicine, ophthalmology, neurology and psychiatry. 4 In support of the petition, Contract submitted a brief and an affidavit stating that while Schlagenhauf had seen red lights on the trailer only ten or fifteen seconds prior to
the collision, an eye-witness had seen the lights from a distance of three1. Physical and Mental Examinations of Persons. (a) Order for examination.
In an action in which the mental or physical condition of a party is in controversy, the
court in which the action is pending may order him to submit to a physical or mental
examination by a physician. The order may be made only on motion for good cause
shown and upon notice to the party to be examined and to all other parties and shall
specify the time, place, manner, conditions, and scope of the examination and the person
or persons by whom it is to be made.

2. 379 U.S. 104 (1964).
3. McCorkhill was joined with Contract Carrier in all the pleadings and both will
be referred to as Contract.
4. The petition recommended a total of nine specialists to permit the trial judge a
selection.
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quarters to one-half mile. The affidavit also stated that Schlagenhauf had
admitted his previous involvement in a similar accident. While the petition
was pending, National answered Greyhound's cross-claim and itself crossclaimed against Greyhound and Schlagenhauf for damage to its trailer. 5 The
district judge, without a hearing, ordered Schlagenhauf to submit to nine
examinations, five more than originally requested. 6 Subsequent to this order
Schlagenhauf applied to the court of appeals for a writ of mandamus against
the respondent district court judge, seeking to set aside the order. 7 Mandamus
was denied and Schlagenhauf's petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court
was granted.8
The Court was immediately confronted with the procedural issue of
whether mandamus was an appropriate remedy. The respondent trial judge
contended that the court of appeals had no authority to issue mandamus. 9
Mandamus is an appropriate remedy "to confine an inferior court to a lawful
exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction,"'10 but it may not be used as a substitute
for appeal." Because the petition for mandamus did contain a substantial
allegation of usurpation of power in ordering the examination of a defendant
in a case of first impression, 1 2 mandamus was held to be an appropriate
remedy. 1
Although Rule 35 on its face applies to "all parties," the petitioner contended that its application to a defendant would be an unconstitutional invasion
of privacy or a modification of his substantive rights. If the rule violated a
5. This cross-claim alleged that Greyhound and Schlagenhauf were negligent in
knowingly permitting Schlagenhauf to drive the bus with impaired vision.
6. This order was corrected after the court of appeals denied mandamus to four
examinations as requested.
7. 321 F.2d 43 (7th Cir. 1963). See 13 BUFFALO L. REV. 623 (1964). There was a
second order entered subsequent to the first. This order was identical to the first and
was based on supplementary petitions filed by Contract and National.
8. 375 U.S. 983 (1964).
9. The court of appeals held it had power to issue mandamus. They then considered
the "in controversy" issue and determined it in favor of respondent. The issue of "good
cause" was not considered. 321 F.2d at 51.
10. See Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21, 26 (1943). The writ is also
appropriate when there is an usurpation of judicial power or clear abuse of discretion.
Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 383 (1953).
11. E.g., Ex parte Fahey, 332 U.S. 258, 259 (1947); United States Alkali Export
Ass'n v. United States, 325 U.S. 196, 202 (1945).
12. In Dinsel v. Pennsylvania R.R., 144 F. Supp. 880 (W.D. Pa. 1956), the issue
was considered, but the court did not order the examination. In Harabedian v. Superior
Court, 195 Cal. App. 2d 26, 15 Cal. Rptr. 420 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961), the defendant was
ordered to submit to a physical examination pursuant to a statutory provision.
13. 379 U.S. at 110. Any future allegations that the trial judge was in error in
ordering a physical or mental examination pursuant to Rule 35 would be in the form
of an appeal and therefore mandamus would not be an appropriate remedy. Id. at 112;
cf. Parr v. United States, 351 U.S. 513 (1956). Mr. Justice Harlan dissented on the
grounds that mandamus was not appropriate. 379 U.S. at 127.
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substantive right then it would be beyond the mandate of the Rules Enabling
Act. 14 These same contentions were raised in Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 15
by a plaintiff who was ordered to submit to a physical examination. It was
decided there that the rule was constitutional and that it was procedural and
not substantive.' 6 With the constitutional issue settled by Sibbach the real
question in Schlagenhauf was whether the rule should be applied to defendants.
The Court held that Rule 35 should apply to defendants 17 in appropriate cases
since discovery "is not a one way proposition."' I s "Issues cannot be resolved
by a doctrine of favoring one class of litigants over another."' 19
There was a further question as to the interpretation of the language
"all parties." The petitioner contended that he was not a party in relation
to the movants at the time the petition for examination was filed, as he was
not a party to Greyhound's cross-claim. 2 0 The court of appeals agreed and
held that the person to be examined must be a party opposing the movants
or at least one of them.2 1 The Supreme Court found this interpretation too
restrictive, 22 and held that the rule requires only that the person to be examined be a party to the case. It is not necessary that he be a party opposing
the movant.2 The petitioner was made a party to the action by virtue of the
original complaint filed by the bus passengers. To hold otherwise "would
14. 48 Stat. 1064 (1934), 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1958), provides that the Rules "shall
not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right .. "
15. 312 U.S. 1 (1941). See Beach v. Beach, 114 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1940), wherein
it is said that the rule is a procedural device, relating exclusively to the obtaining of
evidence.
16. The common law did not recognize an order for the physical examination of
parties.
No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common
law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own
person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law . . . . The inviolability of the person is as much
invaded by a compulsory stripping and exposure as by a blow.
Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251-52 (1891). Cf. Camden & Suburban Ry.
v. Stetson, 177 U.S. 172 (1900) (physical examination of a plaintiff was sustained on
basis of a state statute). See generally 8 WiG-moR, EVIDENCE § 2220 (McNaughten ed.
1961).
17. 379 U.S. at 113.
18. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947).
19. 379 U.S. at 113.
20. Petitioner was a defendant in this action irrespective of the realignment of the
parties. He was a defendant in the original suit and also a defendant in National's crossclaim. Although Greyhound might be considered a plaintiff in relation to its cross-claim,
petitioner was not joined in this claim.
21. 321 F.2d at 49. The court found, however, that petitioner was made an opposing
party vis-A-vis the movant by virtue of National's cross-claim.
22. 379 U.S. at 115. Cf. Kropp v. General Dynamics Corp., 202 F. Supp. 207 (E.D.
Mich. 1962); Yee Szet Foo v. Dulles, 18 F.R.D. 237 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
23. While the movants in this case were codefendants there is no reason to suggest
that the moving party could not just as well be a plaintiff. Mr. Justice Douglas assumed
in his dissenting opinion that the decision allowed a plaintiff to be the moving party.
379 U.S. at 126.
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have the undesirable result of an unnecessary proliferation of cross-claims
' 24

and counter claims."

Rule 35 differs from the other deposition-discovery rules 25 in its requirement that the physical or mental condition of the party be "in controversy."
There is a further requirement that the movant affirmatively demonstrate
"good cause" for the examination.2 6 It is incumbent on the movant to affirmatively put forth, by affidavit or otherwise, evidence sufficient to justify a
finding of "good cause."' 27 An exception to this burden placed on the movant
is in the case where the defendant petitions for an examination of the plaintiff.28 In a negligence action the pleadings alone may be sufficient to meet

the requirements, for the plaintiff by suing for mental or physical injury
places his condition "in controversy" and consequently provides the defendant
with "good cause." This is also true when the defendant asserts his mental
29
or physical condition as a defense to a claim.
In Schlagenhauf the movants sought to satisfy the requirements by filing
as part of their answer a letter alleging that petitioner was not mentally or
physically capable of operating the bus. Outside of the pleadings Contract
submitted the affidavit of the eye-witness to support its petition. This record
was found by the Court to be insufficient to meet the express requirements of
Rule 35: 30 Nothing was stated in the pleadings or affidavit that could justify
the psychiatric, neurological and broad internal medical examinations
ordered. 31 However, had the trial judge directed only an ophthalmological
examination his order probably would have stood. 2 The case was remanded
to the district court for the trial judge to reconsider his order in the light of
3
the guidelines set forth in the opinion. "
24. 379 U.S. at 116.
25. Rules 26-32, oral and written depositions; Rule 33, interrogatories to parties;
Rule 34, production of documents.
26. The lower courts have interpreted the requirement of "good cause" to be a
definite restriction on the use of the rule. See Guilford National Bank of Greensboro v.
Southern Ry., 297 F.2d 921 (4th Cir. 1962) ; cf. Hauger v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry.,
216 F.2d 501 (7th Cir. 1954); Martin v. Capital Transit Co., 170 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir.
1948).
27. 379 U.S. at 118.
28. See Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941).
29. See Richardson v. Richardson, 124 Colo. 240, 236 P.2d 121 (1951) (Insanity
was asserted as a defense to a divorce action) ; Roberts v. Roberts, 198 Md. 299, 82
A.2d 120 (1951).
30. 379 U.S. at 120.
31. Rule 35 also requires the trial judge to delineate the "conditions and scope" of
the examination. The broad examinations ordered below could not meet these requirements.
32. The court stated that it "would be hesitant to set aside a visual examination if
it had been the only one ordered." Id. at 121.
33. Ibid. Mr. Justice Black, dissenting in part, stated that the petitioner's condition
was "in controversy" and that "good cause" was shown when one considered the circumstances of the accident in conjunction with the record. Id. at 122, 124.
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Schlagenhauf seems destined to have a significant role in the future use
of Rule 35. In the future, courts applying the rule to defendants should be
cognizant of the guidelines set forth. Mere conclusory allegations in the plead4
ings will not satisfy the "good cause" and "in controversy" requirements3
While an affidavit may be sufficient in some cases, a full evidentiary hearing
may be required in others.35 The opinion further states that the rule does
not authorize indiscriminate fishing expeditions by a party merely because
an opposing party has been involved in an accident.36
Since the deposition and discovery rules are to be interpreted so that
"civil trials in the federal court no longer need be carried on in the dark," 7
it is only logical and fair that Rule 35 should also apply to defendants, unless,
as Mr. Justice Douglas cautions, it should become an instrument of blackmail.A5 One can readily conceive of situations where a plaintiff denied the

benefit of the rule might be unable to recover for a just claim solely because
of his inability to determine the true mental and physical condition of the
tort-feasor. With the decision in Schlagenhauf, Rule 35 appears to be more
readily available to serve the discovery needs of parties on both sides.
J.

RICHARD LAUVER

34. Id. at 118.
35. Id. at 119.
36. Id. at 121.
37. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. at 501.
38. 379 U.S. at 124, 127. Mr. Justice Douglas would deny all relief under Rule 35
as applied to defendants until the Civil Rules Committee of the Judicial Conference could
draw the necessary guidelines.

PROCEDURE-SERVICE OF PROCESS-SHERIFF'S
RETURN-CONCLUSIVENESS OF RETURN
Hollinger v. Hollinger, 206 A.2d 1 (Pa. 1965).
Hollinger v. Hollinger,' arose when an automobile, driven by defendant,
Rita Hollinger, struck a telephone pole, severely injuring the minor plaintiffs,
passengers in the car. Suit was instituted on the last day prior to the running
of the statute of limitations. The action was brought in behalf of the minors by
their parents against Rita Hollinger.
The defendant by preliminary objection attacked the validity of the service
of process. The sheriff's return stated, inter alia, that service had been made
at 5537 N. Palethorpe St., Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Defendant claimed this
was erroneous and proved conclusively that her dwelling place was not and in
fact never had been at 5537 N. Palethorpe St., but rather at a convent at
2
Merion in Montgomery County.
The issue presented here is whether the sheriff's return is valid and conclusive upon the parties in spite of its incorrectness, i.e., whether evidence is
admissible to show error in the return. The lower court, adhering to the rule
that in the absence of fraud the sheriff's return is conclusive and immune from
attack,3 overruled defendant's objections.
The supreme court reversed; Justice Jones, writing the majority opinion,
stated that the conclusiveness rule cited by the lower court was valid, but inapplicable to the case at bar. The court further held that conclusiveness should
properly be restricted "to facts stated in the return of which the sheriff presumptively has personal knowledge' ' 4 and should not be extended "(a) to facts
stated in the return of which the sheriff cannot be expected to have personal
knowledge and which are based upon information obtained through hearsay
or statements made by third persons or (b) to conclusions based upon facts
known to the sheriff only through statements made by others."5 Chief Justice
Bell6 concurred in the decision. Justices Cohen7 and Roberts8 filed dissenting
opinions.
1. 206 A.2d 1 (Pa. 1965).
2. The mistake in the return resulted from a fictitious address purposely given by
plaintiff's father, George T. Hollinger, to mislead the sheriff.
3. See Vaughn v. Love, 324 Pa. 276, 188 Ati. 299 (1936) ; Vastine v. Fury, 16 Pa.
(2 S. & R.) 425 (1816) ; Commonwealth v. Degillo, 197 Pa. Super. 568, 180 A.2d 267
(1962).
4. 206 A.2d at 3.

5. Ibid.
6. 206 A.2d at 6, urging complete abolition of the conclusiveness rule.
7. 206 A.2d 5, predicting that procedural instability will result from impingement
upon the conclusiveness rule and advocating the sufficiency of defendant's remedy against
the sheriff.
8. 206 A.2d at 6, submitting that the insurance carrier is the real party in interest
and that the conclusiveness rule should not be a substantial issue.
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The Hollinger decision cuts significantly into the conclusiveness rule.
While the court nominally preserved the rule, virtually the only elements of
the return which it left immune to controversion are statements as to the time
and place of service. Thus, in the case at bar, a statement in the return that
process was served at 5537 N. Palethorpe St. was conclusive, but a statement
that 5537 N. Palethorpe was the dwelling house of defendant was non-conclusive. The distinction is that the sheriff presumptively had personal knowledge
of the former, since either he or his agent served process, but not the latter,
since the sheriff must ordinarily rely on statements by a third person as to
the dwelling place of the party to be served. Prior to Hollinger, this personal
knowledge distinction had not been generally accepted. 9
Pennsylvania courts have been less than consistent in their treatment of
the conclusiveness rule. While uniformly recognizing the rule, the cases have
resulted in varying interpretations of it. Vaughn v. Love, 10 a leading case
cited by the minority as well as the majority in Hollinger, affirmed the rule
but held that the return was non-conclusive as to non-residents. Many other
decisions have applied the conclusiveness rule with some modification or
reservation." On the other hand, Commonwealth v. Degillo,12 a recent case
partially overruled by Hollinger, represents a line of authority in favor of
strict preservation of conclusiveness. Certain other cases, while applying the
conclusiveness rule, point out that the court may permit the sheriff to amend
3
his return.'
The apparent effect of Hollinger is that the presumption of the verity
of the sheriff's return may now be rebutted in certain situations where it was
formerly conclusive, but this result should not be construed simply as a victory
of substance over form. Evaluation of the Hollinger rule will depend on
whether the benefit to substantive justice outweighs the harm which may
occur to the procedural system as a result of the partial negation of the conclusiveness rule.
9. See 1 GOODRICH-AMRAM § 1013 (b)-2 (1962). But see, Ehnes v. Wagner, 85
Pa. D. & C. 557 (C.P. 1953), aff'd, 388 Pa. 102, 130 A.2d 171 (1957), permitting controversion as to the identity of the party served; McCormick v. Perry, 14 Pa. D. & C.
810 (C.P. 1930) ; Daly v. Iselin, 10 Pa. Dist. 193 (1900), following a rule similar to
the one adopted in Hollinger.
10. 324 Pa. 276, 188 At. 299 (1936).
11. See Bujniewicz v. Norway Serv. Cleaners Inc., 404 Pa. 328, 171 A.2d 761
(1961), holding the return inconclusive where plaintiff's answer admitted an error in
the return; Minetola v. Samcicio, 399 Pa. 351, 160 A.2d 546 (1960), suggesting that
judgment may be opened if defendant shows both a valid defense and equitable considerations in his favor, and that an erroneous return may constitute such an equitable
consideration; Ehnes v. Wagner, 85 Pa. D. & C. 558 (C.P. 1953) ; McCormick v. Perry,
14 Pa. D. & C. 810 (C.P. 1930) ; Daly v. Iselin, 10 Pa. Dist. 193 (1900).

12.

197 Pa. Super. 568, 180 A.2d 267 (1962).

13. See Morris v. Bender, 317 Pa. 533, 144 Atl. 776 (1935) ; Kane v. Travis, 172
Pa. Super. 220, 92 A.2d 902 (1952) ; Rittenberg v. Stein, 97 Pa. Super. 554 (1901).
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As to the question of substantive injustice: if the defendant is subjected
to the jurisdiction of the court without having been given proper notice as
prescribed and, further, is prohibited from proving error in the sheriff's return, there is clearly an injustice in that the defendant has been deprived of
his right to a proper service of process. However, in the situation given,
there are two possibilities: either the defendant will have actual knowledge
of the suit, or he will not. If he has actual knowledge, the injustice of prohibiting an attack on the incorrect return is purely technical in nature, for
all substantive aspects of the situation are the same as if he had been properly
served. The spirit, if not the letter, of the law has been met. On the other
hand, if the defendant does not have actual knowledge, he is deprived of more
than his procedural rights. He is, in effect, deprived of his right to defend
himself in court. Moreover, the judgment against him may become absolute,
in which case defendant's sole remedy will be against the sheriff. 14 Here,
the result of the conclusiveness rule is substantial injustice. 15 The relief of
that injustice would appear to constitute sufficient reason for the Hollinger
rule, unless an overriding policy consideration exists in support of the conclusiveness rule.
The sanctity of the sheriff's return is of ancient standing at common
law. 16 The reason for its existence, however, has never been clear. Historically,
17
it was said that the sheriff, being an officer of the law, deserved credit.
It has also been suggested that the common law, traditionally conservative in
its allocation of remedies, tended to deny alternative remedies. 18 Thus, the
existence of a remedy against the sheriff was considered sufficient reason for
prohibiting an attack on the return. Both of the above justifications are obviously unsatisfactory today. It is suggested in Hollinger that the rule "tends
to the security of a record."' 9 This argument hardly seems valid since courts
have always permitted records to be opened to correct error or add material
facts. Moreover, assuming the validity of the court's assertion, it is obvious
20
that the security afforded by the rule in its present state is minimal.
In view of the benefit to substantive justice and the questionable utility
14. See Rittenberg v. Stein, supra note 13; Vastine v. Fury, 16 Pa. (2 S. &. R.)
425 (1816).
15. In such a situation, the plaintiff may receive a judgment he does not deserve,
the defendant may be held liable wrongfully, and the sheriff may be held ultimately
liable for a small and completely innocent mistake.
16. See Sunderland, The Sheriff's Return, 16 COLUM. L. REv. 281, 282 (1916),
wherein early cases and texts are cited.
17. Id. at 285.
18. Id. at 287-88.

19. 206 A.2d at 3.
20.

Cf. cases cited notes

10 and 11 supra; see also Vastine v. Fury, 16 Pa.

(2 S. & R.) 425 (1816) stating that the court may grant the sheriff permission to correct an erroneous return.
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of the rule, it seems clear that the Hollinger decision represents an improvement in the law. The question arises, however, whether the court should
have gone still further, as urged by Chief Justice Bell, and abolished the conclusiveness rule altogether. Hollinger differentiates between facts within and
those not within the personal knowledge of the sheriff. The reasoning behind
the distinction is not obvious, nor is it discussed by the court. Unless a
logical basis for the distinction in fact exists, the better view would appear
to be the one proposed by Chief Justice Bell.
One might seek some strong policy consideration in favor of partial retention of the rule. However, the questionable rationale2 ' of the conclusiveness rule is even less compelling in view of the restrictions placed on the
rule's application by Hollinger. Moreover, by establishing an arbitrary criterion, the court has not only retained a degree of the conceded injustice
inherent in the conclusiveness rule, but has also created a new source of
injustice.2

The Hollinger decision seeks to retain the conclusiveness rule, but to
remove the injustice which resulted under the rule.23 Injustice occurred because the return was held incontrovertible as to possible errors contained in
it. The validity of the distinction may be supported by the proposition that
the possibility of a mistake as to facts within the sheriff's personal knowledge,
is negligible, whereas the probability of a mistake is substantially greater
where the facts are obtained from a third person. If this proposition is true
in fact, conclusiveness was correctly abolished as to that portion of the return
which is likely to contain a mistake. Conversely, it was also logical to preserve the conclusiveness of that portion of the return where the chance of an
honest mistake is relatively remote.
Aside from the reason suggested above, there appears to be no basis
for the personal knowledge distinction adopted by the Hollinger court. It
is submitted that the court, faced with the anachronistic conclusiveness rule,
simply chose to limit its harmful effects by narrowing the applicability of the
rule, rather than by direct repudiation. Despite the possible unsoundness of
the personal knowledge distinction, Hollinger represents an improvement in
the law in that the stifling effect of the conclusiveness rule has been partially
abrogated. The true significance of Hollinger v. Hollinger, however, may
21. 206 A.2d at 3, 6.
22. Under the Hollinger rule, two defendants in virtually identical fact situations
may be treated differently for no logical reason; one permitted to attack the return,
while the other is prohibited. See Sunderland, op. cit. supra note 16, at 293.
23. The rule adopted in Hollinger was first announced in Kansas in the case of
Schott v. Linscott, 80 Kan. 536, 103 Pac. 997 (1909). The incongruities of the Kansas
rule are further discussed in Sunderland, op. cit. supra note 16, at 292, 293.
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well be that it has paved the way for the abolition of the sanctity of the
sheriff's return.

24

THOMAS L. WENGER
2

24. But see, 206 A.2d 1, 4 n. , wherein the court hints that its intention may be to
limit application of the Hollinger rule to a very narrow fact situation. It is further
suggested that justice required relief in Hollinger primarily because defendant had no
alternative remedy against the sheriff. The lack of a remedy against the sheriff, in turn,
is said to be based on the fact that the sheriff was "duped" and was free of fault. But no
authority has been found for the proposition that the sheriff's liability is predicated upon
fault. The language of the footnote clearly injects a degree of ambivalence into the
Hollinger decision.

